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ABSTRACT
While conspiracy ideation has attracted overdue attention from social scientists in recent years, little work
focuses on how different pro-conspiracy messages affect the take-up of conspiracy beliefs. In this study, we
compare the effect of explicit and implicit conspiracy cues on the adoption of conspiracy beliefs. We also
examine whether corrective information can undo conspiracy cues, and whether there are differences in the
effectiveness of corrective information based on whether a respondent received an explicit or implicit
conspiracy cue. We examine these questions using a real-world but low-salience conspiracy theory con-
cerning Zika, GM mosquitoes, and vaccines. Using a preregistered experiment (N = 1018: https://osf.io/
hj2pw/), we find that both explicit and implicit conspiracy cues increase conspiracy beliefs, but in both cases
corrections are generally effective. We also find reception of an explicit conspiracy cue and its correction is
conditional on feelings toward the media and pharmaceutical companies. Finally, we find that examining
open-ended conspiracy belief items reveals similar patterns, but with a few key differences. These findings
have implications for how news media cover controversial public health issues going forward.
Introduction
When asked in surveys, large segments of the public are willing to
endorse a variety of conspiracy theories, includingmany concern-
ing public health (Lull, Akin, Hallman, Brossard, & Jamieson,
2018; Oliver & Wood, 2014b). Importantly, conspiracy beliefs
can be hazardous (Bogart, Wagner, Galvan, & Banks, 2010) as
research suggests that exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy the-
ories reduces vaccination intention (Jolley & Douglas, 2014).
While public opinion estimates of conspiracy belief are often
alarming, they may not be surprising. Many conspiracy theories
have been explicitly articulated to the public (McCright &Dunlap,
2017). Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., for example, notably claimed that
“public-health authorities knowingly allowed the pharmaceutical
industry to poison an entire generation of American children,”
(Kennedy, 2005). In this claim, Kennedy paints a vivid and explicit
picture of powerful and secretive forces manipulating the world
against the common good. Further, his claim conforms to the
classic definition of a conspiracy theory, providing an explanation
for events that identifies a small group acting in secret for their
own benefit, against the public interest, as the primary causal
factor (Keeley, 1999; Uscinski, Klofstad, & Atkinson, 2016).
Not all conspiracy cues1 are as explicit as this example.
Conspiracy cues can be far more subtle and implicit, or perhaps
even unintentional (McCright & Dunlap, 2017; Starbird, 2017).
Conspiracy advocates often are more committed to arguing
against official accounts than they are in favor of any single
alternative (Wood & Douglas, 2013). When questioning the
official account or explanation, the presentation of suspicious
coincidences may suffice in place of an articulated theory.
Similarly, the rhetorical strategy of “just asking questions” opens
up space for conspiracy ideation while maintaining some degree
of respectability (Byford, 2014; Oswald, 2016). This style of argu-
ment has been adopted by prominent cable news provocateurs in
recent years, with hosts hinting at potential conspiracies sur-
rounding topics ranging from the safety of vaccines (Novak,
2017) to the deaths of U.S. troops in Niger (Seay, 2017).
In this study, we explore whether exposure to conspiracy cues
about a contemporary health crisis affect conspiracy beliefs.
More specifically, we examine the power of both explicit and
implicit cues to increase endorsement of conspiracy beliefs.
Implicit cues may be an especially dangerous form of conspiracy
communication. First, it may be easier for implicit cues to slip
under the proverbial radar and therefore not be challenged. For
this reason, it is essential to examine whether implicit conspiracy
cues actually promote conspiracy thinking. Second, following
research on the continuing influence effect, inferences drawn
from implicit conspiracy cues may be harder to dislodge in
corrections. We address these issues using a pre-registered sur-
vey experiment (https://osf.io/hj2pw/) in which we vary news
content exposure.
Conspiracy cues in the public sphere
People commonly encounter information relating to supposed
conspiracies (Del Vicario et al., 2016). While some conspiracy
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cues are explicit, some fall short of “connecting the dots” and
instead rely on the recipient to make a conspiracy inference.
It remains an open question how persuasive conspiracy
messages are when they relay suspicious coincidences,
innuendo, and imagination (Starbird et al., 2016) rather than
offer a fully fleshed-out sinister explanation. Unfortunately,
researchers know little about how gradations of explicitness
may affect the public’s conspiracy beliefs. While scholarly
attention to conspiracy theories and their endorsement has
yielded a robust literature on individual differences in such
beliefs, less focus has been given to the role of how informa-
tion and cues promote conspiracy beliefs (Raab, Auer, Ortlieb,
& Carbon, 2013; Uscinski et al., 2016).
Our study is part of a growing body of work that examines
both the role of informational cues and predispositions in
conspiracy beliefs and attitudes (Nyhan et al., 2016; Uscinski
et al., 2016). Following the suggestion of Uscinski et al. (2016,
p. 68), our goal is to employ more “elaborate treatments” that
“incorporate richer sets of information” to examine how more
ecologically valid subtleties influence adoption.
While it is reasonable to expect an explicit conspiracy cue
to produce greater conspiracy belief than a more subtle refer-
ence (e.g., O’Keefe, 1997), we also argue that news content can
transmit conspiracy ideas simply by suggesting them (e.g.,
Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). This argument is consistent with
prior research that finds that conspiracy beliefs are rooted in
illusory pattern recognition (Prooijen, Douglas, & De
Inocencio, 2017). Likewise, prior work shows that “people
construct a plausible explanation for an important event by
integrating all pieces of information available, even if this
information implies a huge conspiracy,” (Raab et al., 2013).
During times of high uncertainty, people may be especially
prone to jumping to conspiracy conclusions, inferring con-
spiracies from innocuous errant data in official accounts
(Keeley, 1999). Given the inherent uncertainty of controver-
sial cutting-edge science and medicine, use of the genetically
modified mosquito (Lull et al., 2018) provides an especially
useful context in which to examine the effects of instances
where implicit informational cues can produce an increase in
conspiracy beliefs. Examining this case, we hypothesize that:
H1. Both explicit and implicit cues increase conspiracy belief
(compared to a control), but the effect of explicit cues is
greater than the effect of implicit cues.
Correcting conspiracy beliefs
Research has suggested that misperceptions may be difficult to
correct, and in some cases corrections may make mispercep-
tions worse (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). More recent research
suggests that corrections may be more effective than initially
feared (e.g., Wood & Porter, 2018), but as a special subset of
misperceptions (Miller, Saunders, & Farhart, 2016), conspiracy
beliefs are often noted for their stickiness and thus may be less
amenable to correction efforts (Jolley & Douglas, 2017; Nyhan,
Reifler, & Ubel, 2013). Moreover, our information treatments
concern vaccines and GMOs, scientific developments that may
be integrated with more long-standing beliefs (Bode & Vraga,
2018; Jolley & Douglas, 2017; Nyhan et al., 2013).
That said, we do not try to correct long-held and deeply
rooted conspiracy beliefs per se. Instead, in order to examine
information effects in the spread of conspiracy beliefs, we inten-
tionally focus on a conspiracy theory likely to be novel to
respondents. Our experimental vignette’s focus on the cause of
the Zika virus in Brazil is likely a low-stakes belief for our sample
in the United States. With one’s sense of self not at stake,
corrections may be more effective (Lyons, 2017). On balance,
then, we expect corrective efforts will counteract the conspiracy
cues. We are agnostic as to whether the corrections will create a
reduction in conspiracy beliefs relative to the control.
Our experiment takes inspiration from Rich and
Zaragoza (2016), who explore whether the explicitness of
misinformation matters for corrective effects. In an experi-
ment centering on a fictional news story about a burglary,
these authors found implicit misinformation about the
suspect was more difficult to correct than explicit misin-
formation. The authors suggest the correction was less
effective in this case because it was more difficult for
participants to revise their initial beliefs. Individuals may
fail to recognize that a correction is inconsistent with their
initial understanding, and therefore not engage in effortful
updating. Consequently, individuals may build a causally
coherent understanding of the event around the mislead-
ing inference, bolstered by self-generated elaborations. For
this reason, we hypothesize that the correction will be less
effective in the implicit case. In summary, we expect that:
H2. Corrections will reduce conspiracy belief in both implicit
and explicit cue conditions.
H3. The correction will be less effective with the implicit
conspiracy cue than with explicit conspiracy cue.
The role of individual predispositions
A number of cognitive traits and attitudes are associated with
conspiracy beliefs. In broad outline, both a general conspir-
atorial mindset and issue-relevant attitudes affect receptivity
to conspiracy cues (Uscinski et al., 2016). Our analyses exam-
ine these variables as potential moderators of receptivity to
both the initial conspiracy cue and to its correction. In parti-
cular, we are interested in whether any predisposition-based
heterogeneity in information effects consistently differs by
level of cue explicitness. In other words, we examine whether
the importance of predispositions differs across the strength
of conspiracy cues.
Domain-specific predispositions
Belief in specific conspiracy theories is tied to domain-specific
predispositions—political conspiracy belief is conditional on
partisanship, for instance (Miller et al., 2016; Uscinski et al.,
2016). In this study, we examine endorsement of a conspiracy
theory centering on genetically modified mosquitos and vac-
cines. Therefore, we examine affect toward pharmaceutical
companies and biotechnology-bogeyman Monsanto, as well as
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vaccine concern and GMO concern, as domain-specific predis-
positions that might condition uptake of the conspiracy cue.
Conspiratorial predispositions
More broadly, many researchers have suggested that belief
in specific conspiracy theories is driven by an underlying
predisposition toward seeing events as the outcome of
conspiracy (Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012). Recent stu-
dies have measured this predisposition directly (Lantian,
Muller, Nurra, & Douglas, 2016). As Uscinski et al. (2016,
p. 60) summarize:
This disposition can be thought of as driving people to be biased
against powerful actors in a way that leads them to accuse those
actors of collusion. [. . .] All else equal, the more predisposed
people are toward conspiratorial thinking, the more likely they
will be to accept a specific conspiracy theory when given an
informational cue that makes conspiratorial logic explicit.
In our case, we also assess the role of such a predisposition in the
uptake of a cue when the conspiratorial logic is merely implicit.
Other cognitive traits linked to conspiracy belief
Other styles of thinking—related to but distinct from the
conspiratorial mindset itself—may affect propensity to accept
claims lacking evidence. Individuals who make sense of the
world through the Manichean narrative of good versus evil
or see secret cabals behind commonplace events (Oliver &
Wood, 2014a) are more likely to believe conspiracy theories.
Further, those who have a greater need to be unique may be
more likely to believe conspiracy theories in order to stand
out from their peers (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian,
Muller, Nurra, & Douglas, 2017); their beliefs are based on
a self-perceived unique ability to see through official
accounts.
Those who mistrust authority (granting less deference to
experts or exhibiting negative feelings toward the media
(Miller et al., 2016; Saunders, 2017)), those who rely more
on intuition (Garrett & Weeks, 2017), and those who feel
they lack control over their environment (Prooijen et al.,
2017) or ability to know the truth (Garrett & Weeks, 2017)
are also more predisposed to conspiracist ideation. In con-
trast, those who score higher in cognitive reflection may be
better able to resist conspiracy cues (Pennycook & Rand,
2018).
In sum, domain-specific predispositions, a general pre-
disposition to conspiracism, and various cognitive traits
have been linked to conspiracy beliefs. However, this
research has progressed in a piecemeal fashion. Few if any
studies test these various predispositions concurrently. Only
the most recent work (Enders, Smallpage, & Lupton, 2018;
Uscinski et al., 2016) has married conspiratorial mindset
with domain-specific predispositions (in their case, parti-
sanship), and at least in politics both a general conspira-
cism dimension and partisan attitudes seem to matter. We
attempt to assess the relative strength of multiple individual
difference factors in our study. We pose the following
exploratory research question:
RQ1. Which potential moderators, if any, condition the treat-
ment effects?
Collateral damage
It is possible informational cues may have unintended con-
sequences. Corrections may be offset by attitudinal shifts else-
where, which Khanna and Sood (2017) liken to a game of
“whack-a-mole.” We examine whether corrections are asso-
ciated with increases in perceptions of journalistic bias. We
also examine the potential for spillover effects on perceptions
of vaccine efficacy and behavioral intent. We do so despite the
fact that the conspiracy theory in our design should have no
influence in this domain, as conspiracy beliefs are noted for
their inconsistency (Wood et al., 2012).
Methods
Sample
Data come from an Amazon Mechanical Turk sample of 1018
American adults, collected in January 2018. Participants were
paid $0.75 for their participation. Our sample is 52% female
and 81% white (with 8% reporting Hispanic origin). Our
median age category is 25–34, and the median respondent
has a 4-year college degree.
Design and procedure
Hypotheses and research questions were addressed in the
context of a real-world, but low salience, conspiracy theory
surrounding the Zika epidemic (APPC, 2016; Lull et al., 2018)
in Brazil. Importantly, this is an existing theory and not one
that we created out of whole cloth for the purposes of this
study. More specifically, this conspiracy theory alleged that
the Zika epidemic was the result of the release of genetically
modified mosquitoes by a subsidiary of a pharmaceutical and
biotechnology company in order to generate the need for
vaccine, from which the parent pharmaceutical company
would profit.
The experiment used a 5-cell design (2 [implicit/explicit
conspiracy cue] X 2 [correction/none], with a control; the full
treatments are available in the appendix). Participants were
exposed to one of three initial information treatments varying
in their amount of conspiracy information. The control
included only a basic description of the Zika crisis. The
explicit conspiracy cue condition included the full theory as
attributed to “concerned citizens,”—including the responsible
party (Oxitec), their motivation (profit from vaccines devel-
oped by pharmaceutical parent company), and the means by
which they allegedly carried out the plan (GM mosquitoes),
and made explicit connections among these. The explicit
condition also included number of pieces of information
that implicitly supported those claims—such as the need for
a vaccine and the availability of funding for those who can
solve the crisis, and Oxitec’s release of GM mosquitoes in
Brazil prior to the Zika outbreak. The implicit condition
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included this information but not the explicit claims. In their
place, a Brazilian politician was quoted asking “who bene-
fits?”—vaguely implying a conspiracy. Half of those exposed
to either the implicit or explicit conspiracy cue were then
randomly exposed to a fact-check clarifying the actual origin
of the Zika epidemic, the role of GM mosquitoes in combat-
ing it, and the company’s lack of ties to a vaccine trial.
Participants first provided responses to moderator mea-
sures before reading their assigned informational treatment,
and finally gave responses for outcome measures and demo-
graphics. All participants were debriefed with accurate
information.
Measures
Dependent variables
The primary dependent variables measured conspiracy beliefs
directly on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree). The three items addressed various aspects of the con-
spiracy (i.e., responsible party, motivation, means): “A phar-
maceutical company is probably responsible for the Zika
outbreak in Brazil,” (M = 2.91, SD = 1.79); “A pharmaceutical
company probably spread Zika in order to profit from the
vaccine,” (M = 2.93, SD = 1.84); and “A pharmaceutical
company probably spread Zika through genetically modified
mosquitoes,” (M = 2.95, SD = 1.81). The items scaled extre-
mely well (Chronbach’s α = .96), so were averaged and stan-
dardized. Due to the novel conspiracy content we employ,
these measures are necessarily novel as well. However, we
borrow the basic structure of the questions from the factual
beliefs literature (Lyons, 2017), while addressing the various
components of conspiracy theories (Keeley, 1999).
Although the 7-point scale described above should allow us to
measure beliefs in line with the vast majority of the literature on
both misperceptions generally and conspiracy beliefs in particu-
lar, closed-end questions can overstate the proportion of people
who strongly hold false or unsupported beliefs (Schuman &
Presser, 1980). Therefore, we also collected open- ended
responses from participants. Our alternative measurement may
reduce expressions of belief that respondents do not hold with
conviction, or when not prompted first with a conspiracy theory.
However, it should also be noted that open-ended measures may
be conservative, particularly when the false belief may be subject
to social desirability bias (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017). As a
final note of caution, “[i]t is also unclear how to arbitrate
between the results of different measurement approaches,”
(Flynn et al., 2017). Regardless, as a stricter test of our hypoth-
eses, our open-ended items are intended to measure self-gener-
ated conspiracy belief, so were asked prior to the direct measure.
Participants were asked: “What caused Zika to spread in Brazil?”
and on the following page, “Why were genetically modified
mosquitos released in Brazil?” Responses to the first question
that mentioned the GM mosquito, GMOs, or a pharmaceutical
company were coded as conspiracy beliefs.2 Responses to the
second question mentioning the intent to spread Zika, or the
intent to sell vaccines, were coded as conspiracy beliefs.
Open-ended responses were coded using five independent
raters for each of the 1,018 experiment participants’ two
responses. Ratings were gathered via mTurk, using workers
based in the U.S. with at least a 75% approval rating (Lind,
Gruber, & Boomgaarden, 2017). To assess the inter-rater
reliability of Turkers’ ratings we calculated the Intraclass
Correlation Coefficient (ICC), the recommended procedure
for assessing inter-rater reliability for multiple raters (Shrout
& Fleiss, 1979). The ICC values were high: .94 for what caused
Zika to spread, and .86 for why genetically modified mosqui-
tos were released in Brazil. In these open-ended questions, 9%
of the sample expressed conspiracy beliefs about the cause of
the spread, while 7.3% did so for the motivation behind the
release. The two variables were only modestly corre-
lated (r = .29).
Following the primary dependent variables, those of second-
ary interest were recorded. Perception of bias was measured
first by asking whether the article seemed biased (yes = 1).
Those answering affirmatively indicated direction of bias
(−1 = anti-GM mosquito company, 1 = pro-GM mosquito
company), and finally degree of bias (1 = slightly, 3 = extremely).
This resulted in a 7-point measure of perceived bias in the
article centered at 0 (M = −.27, SD = 1.37). Because the
conspiracy treatments did not express doubt about vaccine
efficacy, we did not expect any effects in this domain. To
ensure no unintended effects occurred, however, we included
two items focused on vaccine efficacy and intention, measured
on 7-point scales (1 = strong disagree, 7 = strongly agree): “A
Zika vaccine would probably be effective,” (M = 5.22,
SD = 1.19) and “If available, I would seek a Zika vaccine before
traveling to an affected region” (M = 5.18, SD = 1.58).
Moderators
A series of traits, orientations, and attitudes were measured as
potential moderators. Specifically, we examined the following
potential moderators: vaccine and GMO concern; feelings
toward pharmaceutical companies, Monsanto, and the
media; predisposition to conspiracy belief (including beliefs
in secret cabals and Manichean world view); cognitive reflec-
tion; deference to expertise; reliance on intuition; need for
uniqueness; and locus of control.
Vaccine concern (“I am concerned about serious side effects
of vaccines,” M = 3.44, SD = 2.01) and GMO concern (“I am
concerned about serious side effects of GMOs,” M = 4.34,
SD = 1.88) were measured on a 7-point scale. Feeling thermo-
meters (100 = very warm feeling) were employed to measure
affect toward pharmaceutical companies (M = 32.43,
SD = 23.27), Monsanto (M = 29.62, SD = 24.21), and the
media (M = 41.68, SD = 25.98).
Predisposition to conspiracy belief (M = 6.17, SD = 1.88)
was measured using agreement with a single 9-point item: “I
think that the official version of the events given by the autho-
rities very often hides the truth” (Lantian et al., 2016). Secret
cabal belief (M = 4.13, SD = 1.72) was measured with a single
item: “Much of what happens in the world today is decided by a
small and secretive group of individuals,” as was Manichean
worldview (M = 4.02, SD = 1.70): “Politics is ultimately a
struggle between good and evil” (Oliver & Wood, 2014a).
Following Pennycook and Rand (2018), cognitive reflection
(M = 0.52, SD = .30) was measured by combining the three-item
standard Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) using alternate word-
ing (Patel, 2017), and the 4-item non-numeric CRT-2 (Thomson
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& Oppenheimer, 2016). Both were presented in multiple choice
format (Patel, 2017), with the intuitive-incorrect choice listed
first. Correct responses were scored as 1, and all other responses
as 0. Reliability was acceptable for both the standard CRT
(α = .72) and the CRT-2 (α = .60), as well the combined
scale (α = .77).
Finally, four scales assessing various orientations were mea-
sured (7 = strongly agree). Deference to expertise (M = 3.89,
SD = 1.11) included three items: “Experts know best what is
good for the public”; “Experts should do what they think is best,
even if they have to persuade people that it is right,” and “Public
officials care what ordinary people think,” (Brossard & Nisbet,
2007; Pingree, 2011). Reliance on intuition (M = 4.63, SD = 1.27)
included two items: “I can usually feel when a claim is true or
false even if I can’t explain how I know”; and “I trust my gut to
tell me what’s true and what’s not,” (Garrett & Weeks, 2017).
Need for uniqueness (M = 4.12, SD = 1.37) consisted of two
items: “I intentionally do things to make myself different from
those around me”; and “Being distinctive is important to me,”
(Lynn & Harris, 1997). Locus of control (M = 3.86, SD = .90)
included items assessing both personal control and broader
epistemic control. The three traditional locus of control items
included “I like taking responsibility”; “I wish someone else
could make most of the decisions in life for me”; and “I often
have the feeling that I have little influence over what happens to
me.” The epistemic control items, concerning the belief that
truth is political, included: “Scientific conclusions are shaped
by politics”; and “Facts are dictated by those in power,”
(Garrett & Weeks, 2017).
Other variables
Beyond basic demographics, party identification (42.5%
Democrat), and ideology (M = 3.54, SD = 1.83, 7 = very con-
servative) were measured as potential confounds. Finally, we
measured self-reported issue familiarity to assess the novelty of
the issue to respondents. Measured on 5-point scales (5 = extre-
mely familiar), the familiarity items addressed Zika in general
(M = 2.86, SD = .92), “the theory that GM mosquitoes were
responsible for spreading Zika,” (M = 1.48, SD = .92), and “the
theory that a pharmaceutical company was motivated to spread
Zika in order to sell vaccines” (M = 1.46, SD = .92). These
measurements indicate that salience of both the issue and the
conspiracy theory was very low, as intended.
Balance check
A balance check was conducted for age, sex, education, race,
Hispanic origin, partisanship, ideology, and all moderators
listed above. Random assignment was successful for all but
education (F(6, 1,011) = 2.12, p = .049), which was controlled
for in subsequent analyses.
Results
Effects of conspiracy cues and correction
Direct Measure
Hypotheses and research questions were addressed using
Ordinary Least-Squares regression for the direct belief scale
and logistic regression for the open response measures. As
shown in Figure 1, the first model addressed the main effects
hypotheses (H1–H3) with the direct conspiracy belief scale as
the dependent variable (full results of all models reported in
the supplementary materials).3 Those in both the implicit and
explicit conditions exhibited significantly greater conspiracy
beliefs than those in the control (b = .40, p < .001 and b = .76,
p < .001, respectively). A Wald test confirmed the effect of the
explicit condition was significantly stronger than the implicit
condition (p < .001). Thus H1 that the explicit cue would have
a larger effect than the implicit cue was supported.
Neither corrected condition was distinguishable from the
control, supporting H2 corrections would reduce conspiracy
beliefs for both explicit and implicit cues. Finally, H3, which
stated that the correction would be less effective in the
implicit condition, was assessed using a Wald test. There
was no significant difference between the two corrected
conditions (p = .79), and so H3 was rejected. Full results
Figure 1. Treatment effects on direct measure of conspiracy belief.
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are reported in Supplementary Materials Table 1. These
results are robust to the inclusion of the full set of predis-
positions as covariates, as shown in the supplementary mate-
rials (Table 3 and Figure 5).
Open-ended measures
Turning to open-ended data using logistic regression (Figure 2),
we find again that explicit cues are strongest in generating con-
spiracy beliefs about why Zika spread, and why GM mosquitos
were released in Brazil (log odds coefficient = 3.00, p < .001, and
log odds coefficient = 2.88, p < .001, respectively). Meanwhile,
those in implicit conspiracy treatment condition exhibited signif-
icantly greater conspiracy belief about why Zika spread than did
those in the control (log odds coefficient = 1.59, p < .05), but the
implicit cue’s effect on belief about why GM mosquitos were
released was not significant (log odds coefficient = 1.05, p = .12).
Most importantly, we find that corrections were ineffective at
negating explicit cue effects on conspiracy beliefs when examining
open-ended responses, for both the Zika and GM items (the
corrected explicit cue’s effects on these log odds coefficients
were 1.90, p < .01 and 1.67, p < .01, respectively). That said, a
series of Wald tests showed that self-generated conspiracy beliefs
are lower after exposure to corrections, for both implicit cues
(p < .06 for both beliefs) and explicit cues (p < .001 for both
beliefs). They also showed that conspiracy beliefs are more likely
to be spontaneously offered after exposure to explicit rather than
implicit cues (p < .001 for both beliefs). Overall, these results
therefore also demonstrate that the information treatments
worked as expected, as explicit cues produce greater automatic
conspiracy beliefs than implicit cues, and corrections reduce con-
spiracy beliefs regardless of the initial cues.
Exploratory analyses
Conditional effects
RQ1 asked whether a series of psychological predispositions
would moderate either conspiracy cue effects or correction
effects. Examining the direct measure of conspiracy belief
with each moderator tested separately, we find evidence of
two significant moderators—affect toward the media and
affect toward pharmaceutical companies (Table 4).
First, receptivity to conspiracy cues was conditional on feelings
toward the media. Those with warmer feelings toward the media
were less influenced by the explicit conspiracy cue (b = ‒.01,
p < .05). Or conversely, those who dislike the media in general
were more receptive to explicitly stated conspiracy information.
Receptivity to the explicit conspiracy cue was also condi-
tional on feelings toward pharmaceutical companies, as
shown in Figure 3. Those with colder feelings toward phar-
maceutical companies were more receptive to the conspiracy
theory when presented explicitly, in both uncorrected
(b = ‒.01, p < .05) and corrected conditions (b = ‒.01, p < .01).
We also include tests of these conditional effects while
controlling for all other potential moderators in our supple-
mentary analyses (Table 5). In brief, negative affect plays a
stronger role in conditioning receptivity in these models than
in those without the full controls. Negative feelings toward the
media and pharmaceutical companies continue to exacerbate
the effects of explicit conspiracy cues in these models. In
addition, we now also see that negative feelings toward the
media increase the effect of the uncorrected implicit cue,
while negative feelings toward pharmaceuticals increase
effects of both uncorrected and corrected implicit cues.
Turning to conditional effects on open-ended measures, we
find a number of significant interactions, but these are fairly
inconsistent, as shown in the supplementary materials. Given
that our analyses of conditional effects are exploratory, these
findings provide inconclusive evidence regarding the role of
these predispositions in conditioning cue uptake. As with the
direct measure, we also include tests of these conditional
effects while controlling for all other predispositions in our
supplementary analyses (Tables 6–9).
We hope these exploratory results of potential moderators
will be useful to future re- searchers to follow-up on or to use
in meta-analyses. Given the variegated results, we urge caution
Figure 2. Treatment effects on open response measure of conspiracy belief.
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in over-interpreting whether specific variables moderate the
effect of conspiracy cues. Our most consistent findings relate
to affect toward the media and pharmaceutical companies.
Perceptions of bias, vaccine efficacy, and vaccination
intent
We also conducted exploratory tests regarding effects on
perception of bias and vaccine efficacy and intention. As
shown in Figure 4, each condition except the corrected impli-
cit conspiracy treatment induced stronger perceptions of bias
against the company that developed the GM mosquito.
Specifically, exposure to the implicit cue alone (b = ‒.45,
p < .001), the explicit cue alone (b = −1.12, p < .001), and a
correction following the explicit cue (b = ‒.47, p < .001) each
resulted in greater perceived bias against the company por-
trayed as the potential nefarious actor (versus the control
condition, see Table 10 for full results). In addition, Wald
tests confirm that the effect from an explicit cue was clearly
stronger than the effect from an implicit cue (p < .001), while
a correction significantly reduced the perceived bias for both
the explicit and implicit cues (p < .001 for both conditions).
Together, these results provide further evidence validating the
treatments, since respondents are correctly reacting more to
the overtly conspiratorial cues in the explicit condition and
perceiving a more nuanced picture whenever corrections are
present. In sum, the corrections did not result in perceptions
of bias in a conspiracy-consistent direction, as is sometimes
feared (in this case, that people would view the stimuli as
biased in favor of GMOs), yet the information produced the
expected differences across the treatments.
Finally, we tested for heterogeneous effects of the correc-
tion on perceived bias, discovering one significant interaction
(Table 10). Individuals with a more external locus of control
were more likely to perceive a bias in favor of the GM
mosquito company in the explicit correction condition
(b = .53, p < .05). In general, though, it appears that the
news outlet debunking the conspiracy theory did not increase
Figure 4. Treatment effects on perception of bias.
Figure 3. Average marginal effects of treatments on conspiracy belief.
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the perception that they favored the party argued to be inno-
cent. On the contrary, compared to the control group, respon-
dents exposed to either implied or explicit conspiracy cues
against a company exhibited greater perception that the com-
pany was treated unfairly.
Lastly, we explored whether conspiracy cues or correction
influenced perceived vaccine efficacy or behavioral intent.
There were no spillover effects of conspiracy cues or correc-
tions on vaccine-related attitudes (see supplementary materi-
als Table 11 for full results).
Discussion
These results further our understanding of the role of infor-
mational cues in the transmission of conspiracy theories.
When examining the direct measure of conspiracy belief, we
find that although explicit conspiracy cues are most influen-
tial, implicit presentation can also produce conspiracy belief
among the public. However, fact-checking generally appears
to offset the conspiracy cue’s influence.
In this example of an important but low salience public
health crisis, a very limited set of moderators emerge (specifi-
cally affect toward the media and pharmaceutical companies),
and appear only to matter when the information is explicitly
stated. These findings cut both ways. On the positive side, only
those who have negative views of the media or of pharmaceu-
tical companies are especially likely to take up explicit conspi-
racy cues. On the negative side, this means that uptake of
conspiracy ideation (in this case, at least) is not limited to
those apt to believe in conspiracy theories in the first place.
Finally, the news media appear capable of inadvertently trans-
mitting conspiracy beliefs, and readers’ receptivity to the subtle
cues we examined does not depend on either a conspiratorial
worldview or low trust toward the target groups.
Our results also present a notable disparity between the
direct and open-ended measure of belief: Fact-checking was
ineffective at reducing the effect of explicit conspiracy cue on
open-response. Although the correction in our design provided
a causal replacement for the conspiratorial explanation of the
Zika epidemic, it is possible it may have been too close to the
misinformation to fully displace it. Specifically, the timing of
the mosquito release (before or after the epidemic) may be too
subtle of a distinction for a causal correction to override when
respondents must later personally generate their own causal
explanation. That said, we cannot definitively determine what
accounts for the disparity. For this reason, research on mis-
perceptions and conspiracy beliefs should continue to probe
the implications of measurement decisions (Flynn et al., 2017).
Finally, beyond their impact on conspiracy beliefs, we find
little evidence that information treatments result in undesir-
able spillover effects on perceptions of media bias or percep-
tions of vaccine efficacy or intent (assuaging fears to the
contrary, e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014).
However, the study is not without limitations. It is possible,
for instance, that the influence of conspiracy cues and correc-
tive information may in part be attributable to demand effects;
respondents to online survey experiments (e.g., mTurk work-
ers) may treat the belief outcome measures we employed as
something more along the lines of an attention check,
particularly with novel or low-salience information. However,
recent evidence suggests demand effects in survey experiments
are less prevalent than previously thought (Mummolo &
Peterson, 2018). Moreover, equivalent effects of fact-checking,
for example, have been detected in both mTurk and popula-
tion-based samples (Nyhan, Porter, Reifler, & Wood, n.d.).
Further, although we assessed a range of potential mod-
erators, including domain-specific predispositions, conspira-
torial predispositions, and other cognitive traits linked to
conspiracy belief, we were not able to include all potentially
relevant items in our design. Additional research should
investigate the potential role of additional items in the uptake
of health conspiracy cues, such as health knowledge, moral
beliefs, and more granular measures of trust in information
than our media affect item. Another methodological concern
is use of single item measures, particularly the positively
valenced vaccine efficacy and intent items. This may have
resulted in acquiescence bias.
Despite these limitations, this study makes several
broad contributions. First, we show how informational
variation affects the adoption of novel conspiracy beliefs.
Most importantly, we show that conspiracy beliefs can be
increased even when conspiracy cues are subtle and impli-
cit. We hope that this study helps provide a richer under-
standing of the trans-mission of conspiracy beliefs—
particularly the news media’s role—which heretofore has
been lacking (Uscinski et al., 2016). Our findings also offer
insight for journalism practice. Journalists should avoid
including “errant data” that may be misconstrued under
conditions of uncertainty,4 such as those surrounding
public health crises and a rapidly developing response by
the scientific community (and of course, journalists should
not uncritically repeat explicit conspiracy theories). At the
same time, we offer further evidence that fact-checking is
likely effective when targeting less ingrained beliefs — in
this case, those related to a potential conspiracy.
More generally, misinformation is an increasing concern in
the field of health communication, at least in part due to
changes in the information environment (e.g., Del Vicario
et al., 2016). This attention has highlighted the need for
research to identify evidence-based strategies for correction
(Bode & Vraga, 2018; Vraga & Bode, 2017). Our findings
parallel those of others who show authoritative sources are
able to diminish health related misperceptions (e.g. Vraga &
Bode, 2017). We add to this field of research the finding that
such corrections are likely to work roughly as well against
both explicit and implicit cues.
The findings also point to a plausible, if overlooked,
account for how some misinformation may spread. As
Southwell, Thorson, and Sheble (2018) note in a recent
“Agenda for Misinformation Research,” not all misinfor-
mation is malicious (p. 290–2). Nonetheless, we show here
how the potentially unintentional inclusion of stray details
could ultimately produce misperceptions about public
health crises. Our experiment allowed us to demonstrate
an under-appreciated way misinformation may enter the
information environment via traditional media gate-
keepers themselves (not Reddit or Twitter users), with
no malicious intent necessary.
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In practice, though, news professionals will still be best
served by providing conspiracy theory-preempting causal
explanations of events whenever possible. While our work
suggests that in public health crises, corrections can be effec-
tive at reducing the effects of novel conspiracy cues (without
prompting perceptions of bias), this finding should ultimately
be interpreted with caution. For instance, timing may be
critical. Beliefs might be more enduring if the correction is
more delayed than the one delivered in our survey experi-
ment. Second, more longstanding beliefs may be less correct-
able, as a great deal of work suggests (e.g., Nyhan et al., 2013).
Finally, effective fact-checking should not be seen as a free
pass, encouraging a kitchen-sink approach to reporting with
corrections to follow. Indeed, the reach of the correction is
almost certain to be less than that of the initial provocative
story (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018), and the resulting con-
spiracy beliefs may then continue to be spread via interperso-
nal networks (B. Southwell, 2017). Similarly, even in a low
salience context, a clear cut (and politicized) elite-to-in-group
message may have much more profoundly negative effects.
Looking ahead, our findings also suggest several direc-
tions for future work. Given the effect of implicit conspi-
racy cues in our study, and the potentially widespread
existence of such information in both traditional and
emergent media, such cues deserve further investigation.
Our study provides some comparison of effects across cues
(e.g., effect size, responsiveness to correction, contingency
on predispositions), but future work might further com-
pare the properties of beliefs generated by processing
implicit and explicit cues. As with any short-term social
science experiment, an important question raised by our
findings is the persistence of cues’ effects over time. When
possible, future studies should be designed to measure
effects of mal-information and interventions at various
points in time. Likewise, more work is needed to better
understand how various forms of mal-information, as well
as corrective information, spread through both online and
offline interpersonal networks.
Although only a first step, we find the dangers of implicit
conspiracy cues warrant greater scrutiny. Under conditions of
great uncertainty, professional communicators must avoid the
inclusion of information that can be misconstrued to suggest
bad actors, nefarious motives, or monstrous methods.
Notes
1. In this article, we use conspiracy cue to refer to any piece of
information that may induce conspiracy ideation, while conspi-
racy theory refers to a specific conspiracy-based explanation for
events (Keeley, 1999; Uscinski et al., 2016). In other words, con-
spiracy cues may lead to belief in conspiracy theories.
2. Overall, the most common answer was simply “mosquito(es)”
(37.1% of respondents). Only respondents including a mention
of GMOs or a pharmaceutical company were were coded as
having given an conspiracy answer.
3. Per our preregistration, we also conducted tests of the three direct
belief items independently with no difference in results, which is
to be expected given the high Chronbach’s α for the three items.
4. It should be noted that within the context of a 24-hour news
cycle, news media may benefit from suggesting a more nefarious
story than current evidence supports, hoping to garner audience
interest. If so, implicit conspiracy cues are likely to persist within
the current news environment.
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